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THE 



CLASSIFICATION 



OF 



THE SCIENCES 



TO WHICH ARE ADDED 



KEASCMS FOE DISSENTING 



FROM THE 



PHILOSOPHY OF M. COMTE 



HERBERT SPENCER, 

AUTHOR OF " ILLTJSTEATIONS OF UNIVERSAL PBOGBESS, 11 "EDUCATION," " FIE8T 
pbinciples,'" "essays: MOEAL, POLITICAL, AND ESTHETIC," 

AND THE " PBINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY." 



( 



■r 



NEW YORK: 
D. APPLE TON AND COMPANY, 

448 & 445 BROADWAY. 

1864. 







fX 



OUTLINE 

OF A 



NEW SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY 

By HERBERT SPENCER 



Mr. Spencer has commenced the issue, in periodical parts, of a connected series 
of works, which he has for several years been preparing. Some conception of the 
general aim and scope of the series may be gathered from the following abstract 
of his prospectus : 

FIRST PRINCIPLES. 
Part i. — The Unknowable. Part ii. — -Laws of the Know able. 
(This portion is cow published in one volume. See advertisement at the close 
of the pamphlet). 

THE PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY. 
VOL. I. Part i. — The Data of Biolosy. Part ii. — The Inductions of 

Biology. Part hi. — The Evolution of Life. 
VOL. II. Part iv. — Morphological Development. Part v. — Physiological 
Development. Part vi. — The Laws of Multiplication. 
(Four numbers of this work have appeared. See advertisement). 

THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 

VOL. I. Part i. — The Data of Psychology. Part ii. — The Inductions of 
Psychology. Part hi. — General Synthesis. Part iv. — Special Syn- 
thesis. Part v. — Physical Synthesis. 

VOL. II. Part vi. — Special Analysis. Part til — General Analysis. Pabt 
tiii. — Corollaries. 

THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY. 

VOL. I. Part i. — The Data of Sociology. Part ii. — The Inductions ok 
Sociology. Part hi. — Political Organization. 

VOL. II. Part it. — Ecclesiastical Organization. Part t. — Ceremonial 
Organization. Part vi. — Industrial Organization. 

VOL. III. Part til — Lingual Progress. Part tiii. — Intellectual Pro- 
gress. Part in. — Esthetic Progress. Part x. — Moral Progress. Part 
xi. — The Consensus. 

THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. 
VOL. I. Part i. — The Data of Morality. Part ii. — The Inductions of 

Morality. Part hi. — Personal Morals. 
VOL. II. Part iv. — Justice. Tart v. — Negative Beneficence. Part vi. — 

Positive Beneficence. 

In anticipation of the obvious criticism that the scheme here sketched out is too 
extensive, it may be remarked that an exhaustive treatment of each topic is not 
intended; but simply the establishment of principles, -with such illustrations as 
arc needed to make their bearings fully understood. It may also be pointed out 
that, besi lea minor fragments, one large division {The Principles of Psychology) 
is already in greai pari executed. And a further reply is, that impossible though 
it may prove t;> execute the whole, yet nothing can be said against an attempt to 
s-t forth tin' Firal Principles and to carry their applications as far as circum- 
.-, mc ■- permit 

T i is • wo "ks will be issue 1 quarterly, or as nearly so as possible, in numbers of 
to l >0 pag is each, and will be 'all annual subscribers 

D. APPLETON & CO., 

•1 13 an 1 1 1.") Broa Iway, New York. 



.Si 



THE 

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES 



THE UfiRAltrl 

OF CONGRESSI 

WASHINGTON i 



THE 

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 



In an essay on " The Genesis of Science," originally 
published in 1854, I endeavoured to show that the 
Sciences cannot be rationally arranged in serial order. 
Proof was given that neither the succession in which 
the Sciences are placed by M. Comte (to a criticism of 
whose scheme the essay was in part devoted), nor any 
other succession in which the Sciences can be placed, 
represents either their logical dependence or their his- 
torical dependence. To the question — How may their 
relations be rightly expressed ? I did not then attempt 
any answer. This question I propose now to con- 
sider. 

A true classification includes in each class, those 
objects which have more characteristics in common 
with one another, than any of them have in common 
with any objects excluded from the class. Further, 
the characteristics possessed in common by the colli- 
gated objectSj and not possessed by other objects, are 
more radical than any characteristics possessed in 
common with other objects — involve more numerous 



dependent characteristics. These are two sides of the 
same definition. For things possessing the greatest 
number of attributes in common, are things that pos- 
sess in common those essential attributes on which the 
rest depend; and, conversely, the possession in com- 
mon of the essential attributes, implies the possession 
in common of the greatest number of attributes. Hence, 
either test may be used as convenience dictates. 

If, then, the Sciences admit of classification at all, it 
must be by grouping together the like and separating 
the unlike, as thus defined. Let us proceed to do this. 

The broadest natural division among the Sciences, 
is the division between those which deal with the ab- 
stract relations under which phenomena are presented 
to us, and those which deal with the phenomena them- 
selves. Eelations of whatever orders, are nearer akin 
to one another than they are to any objects. Objects 
of whatever orders, are nearer akin to one another 
than they are to any relations. Whether, as some 
hold, Space and Time are forms of Thought ; or 
whether, as I hold myself, they are forms of Things, 
that have become forms of Thought through organ- 
ized and inherited experience of Things ; it is equally 
true that Space and Time are contrasted absolutely 
with the existences disclosed to us in Space and Time 
and that the Sciences which deal exclusively with 
Space and Time, are separated by the profoundest of 
all distinctions from the Sciences which deal with the 



existences that Space and Time contain. Space is the 
abstract of all relations of co-existence. Time is the 
abstract of all relations of sequence. And dealing as 
they do entirely with relations of co-existence and 
sequence, in their general or special forms, Logic and 
Mathematics form a class of the Sciences more widely 
unlike the rest, than any of the rest can be from one 
another. 

The Sciences which deal with existences themselves, 
instead of the blank forms in which existences are pre- 
sented to us, admit of a sub-division less profound than 
the division above made, but more profound than any 
of the divisions among the Sciences individually con- 
sidered. They fail into two classes, having quite dif- 
ferent aspects, aims, and methods. Every phenomenon 
is more or less composite — is a manifestation of force 
under several distinct modes. Hence result two ob- 
jects of inquiry. We may study the component modes 
of force separately ; or we may study them in their 
relations, as co-operative factors in this composite phe- 
nomenon. On the one hand, neglecting all the inci- 
dents of particular cases, we may aim to educe the 
laws of each mode of force, when it is uninterfered 
with. On the other hand, the incidents of the parti- 
cular case being given, we may seek to interpret the 
entire phenomenon, as a product of the several forces 
simultaneously in action. The truths reached through 
the first kind of inquiry, though concrete inasmuch as 
they have actual existences for their subject-matters, 



6 



are abstract inasmuch, as they refer to the modes of 
existence apart from one another; while the truths 
reached by the second kind of inquiry are properly 
concrete, inasmuch as they formulate the facts in their 
combined order, as they occur in Nature. 

The Sciences, then, in their main divisions, stand 
thus : — 



SCIENCE is < 



that which treats of the forms in ) Abstract / Logic and \ 
which phenomena are known to us J Science \ Mathematics. / 



that which treats of the 
b phenomena themselves 



in their 
elements 



Abstract- /Mechanics, 
Concrete | Physics, 
Science \Chemisiry,etc. 



/Astronomy, 
in their ) Concrete / Geology, Bi( 
k totalities J Science ! Psychology, 



•my, \ 
r,Biology,\ 

l °gy> / 

s>y, etc. / 



\ Sociology, 

It is needful to define the words abstract and con- 
crete as thus used ; since they are sometimes used 
with other meanings. M. Comte divides Science into 
abstract and concrete; but the divisions which he 
distinguishes by these names are quite unlike those 
above made. Instead of regarding some Sciences 
as wholly abstract, and others as wholly concrete, he 
regards each Science as having an abstract part, and 
a concrete part. There is, according to him, an 
abstract mathematics and a concrete mathematics — an 



abstract biology and a concrete biology. He says : — 
"II faut distinguer, par rapport a tous les ordres de 
phenolizes, deux genres de sciences naturelles : les 
unes abstraites, generales, ont pour objet la decouverte 
des lois qui regissent les diverses classes de pheno- 
menes, en considerant tous les cas qu'on peut con- 
cevoir ; les autres concretes, particulieres, descriptives, 
et qu'on designe quelquefois sous le nom de sciences 
naturelles proprement dites, consistent dans Implica- 
tion de ces lois a l'histoire effective des differens etres 
existans." And to illustrate the distinction, he names 
general physiology as abstract, and zoology and botany 
as concrete. Here it is manifest that the words 
abstract and general axe used as synonymous. They 
have, however, different meanings ; and confusion 
results from not distinguishing between their meanings. 
Abstractness means detachment from the incidents of 
particular cases. Generality means manifestation in 
numerous cases. On the one hand, the essential 
nature of some phenomenon is considered, apart from 
the phenomena which disguise it. On the other hand, 
the frequency of recurrence of the phenomenon, with 
or without various disguising phenomena, is the thing 
considered. An abstract truth is rarely if ever 
realized to perception in any one case of which it 
is asserted. A general truth may be realized to 
perception in all of the cases of which it is asserted. 
Some illustrations will make the distinction clear. 
Thus it is an abstract truth that the angle contained 



8 

in a semi-circle is a right angle — abstract in the sense 
that though it does not hold in actually-constructed 
semi-circles and angles, which are always inexact, it 
holds in the ideal semi-circles and angles abstracted 
from real ones ; but this is not a general truth, either 
in the sense that it is commonly manifested in Nature, 
or in the sense that it is a space-relation that compre- 
hends many minor space-relations : it is a quite 
special space-relation. Again, that the momentum 
of a body causes it to move in a straight line at a 
uniform velocity, is an abstract-concrete truth — a 
truth abstracted from certain experiences of concrete 
phenomena ; but it is by no means a general truth : 
so little generality has it, that no one fact in Nature 
displays it. Conversely, surrounding things supply 
us with hosts of general truths that are not in the 
least abstract. It is a general truth that the planets 
go round the Sun from West to East — a truth which 
holds good in something like a hundred cases (includ- 
ing the cases of the planetoids) ; but this truth 
is not at all abstract, since it is perfectly realized 
as a concrete fact in every one of these cases. Every 
vertebrate animal whatever, has a double nervous 
system ; all birds and all mammals are warm- 
blooded — these are general truths, but they are 
concrete truths : that is to say, every vertebrate 
animal individually presents an entire and unqualified 
manifestation of this duality of the nervous system ; 
every living bird exemplifies absolutely or completely 



9 



the warm-bloodedness of birds. What we here call, 
and rightly call, a general truth, is simply a pro- 
position which sums up a number of our actual expe- 
riences ; and not the expression of a truth drawn 
from our actual experiences, but never presented to 
us in any of them. In other words, a general truth 
colligates a number of particular truths; while an 
abstract truth colligates no particular truths, but 
formulates a truth which certain phenomena all in- 
volve, though it is actually seen in none of them. 

Limiting the words to their proper meanings as thus 
denned, it becomes manifest that the three classes 
of Sciences above separated, are not distinguishable 
at all by differences in their degrees of generality. 
They are all equally general ; or rather they are 
all, considered as groups, universal. Every phe- 
nomenon whatever presents at once the subject-matter 
for each of them. In the smallest particle of sub- 
stance we have simultaneously illustrated, the abstract 
truths of relation in Time and Space; the abstract- 
concrete truths in conformity with which the particle 
manifests its several modes of force ; and the concrete 
truths expressing the laws of the joint manifestation 
of these modes of force. Thus these three classes of 
Sciences severally formulate different, but co-extensive, 
classes of facts. Within each group there are truths of 
greater and less generality : there are general abstract 
truths, and special abstract truths ; general abstract- 
concrete truths, and special abstract-concrete truths; 



10 

general concrete truths, and special concrete truths. 
But while within each class there are groups and 
sub-groups and sub-sub-groups which differ in their 
degrees of generality, the classes themselves differ 
only in their degrees of abstractness.* 

* Some propositions laid down by M. Littre, in his lately-published book — 
AugusU Comte et la Philosophic Positive, may fitly be dealt with here. In the 
candid and courteous reply he makes to my strictures on the Comtean classifica- 
tion in " The Genesis of Science," he endeavours to clear up some of the incon- 
sistencies I pointed out; and he does this by drawing a distinction between 
objective generality and subjective generality. He says—" qu'il existe deux 
ordres de generalite, Tune objective et dans les choses, l'autre subjective, abstraite 
et dans 1' esprit." This sentence, in which M. Littre make subjective generality 
synonymous with abstractness, led me at first to conclude that he had in view the 
same distinction as that which I have above explained between generality and 
abstractness. On re-reading the paragraph, however, I found this was not the 
case. In a previous sentence he says — " La biologie a passe de la consideration 
des organes.a, celles des tissus, plus generaux que les organes, et de la consideration 
des tissus a celle des elements anatomiques, plus generaux que les tissus. Mais " 
cette generalite croissante est subjective non objective, abstraite non concrete." 
Here it is manifest that abstract and concrete, are used in senses analogous to 
those in which they are used by M. Comte; who, as we have seen, regards 
general physiology as abstract and zoology and botany as concrete. And it is 
further manifest that the word abstract, as thus used, is not used in its proper 
sense. For, as above shown, no such facts as those of anatomical structure can 
be abstract facts , but can only be more or less general facts . Nor do I under- 
stand M. Littre' s point of view when he regards these more general facts of 
anatomical structure, as subjectively general and not objectively general. The 
structural phenomena presented by any tissue, such as mucous membrane, are 
more general than the phenomena presented by any of the organs which mucous 
membrane goes to form, simply in the sense that the phenomena peculiar to the 
membrane are repeated in a greater number of instances than the phenomena 
peculiar to any organ into the composition of which the membrane enters. And, 
similarly, such facts as have been established respecting the anatomical elements 
of tissues, are more general than the facts established respecting any particular 
tissue, in the sense that they are facts which organic bodies exhibit in a greater 
number of cases — they are objectively more general ; and they can be called 
subjectively more general only in the sense that the conception corresponds with 
the phenomena. 

Let me endeavour to clear up this point : — There is, as M. Littre truly says, 
a decreasing generality that is objective. If we omit the phenomena of Dissolu- 
tion, which are changes from the special to the general, all changes which matter 
undergoes are from the general to the special— are changes involving a decreasing 



11 



Passing to the sub-divisions of these classes, we find 
that the first class is separable into two parts — the 
one containing universal truths, the other non-uni- 
versal truths. Dealing wholly with relations apart 
from related things, Abstract Science considers first, 
that which is common to all relations whatever ; and 
second, that which is common to each order of rela- 
tions. Besides the indefinite and variable connexions 
which exist among phenomena, as occurring together 
in Space and Time, we find that there are also definite 

generality in the united groups of attributes. This is the progress of things 
The progress of thought, is not only in the same direction, but also in the oppo- 
site direction. The investigation of Nature discloses an increasing number of 
specialities ; but it simultaneously discloses more and more the generalities within 
which these specialities fall. Take a case. Zoology, while it goes on multiply- 
ing the number of its species, and getting a more complete knowledge of each 
species (decreasing generality) ; also goes on discovering the common characters by 
which species are united into larger groups (increasing generality). Both these 
are subjective processes ; and in this case, both orders of truths reached are con- 
crete — formulate the phenomena as actually manifested. 

M. Littre, recognizing the necessity for some modification of the hierarchy 
the Sciences, as enunciated by M. Comte, still regards it as substantially true 
and for proof of its validity, he appeals mainly to the essential constitutions of the 
Sciences. It is unnecessary for me here to meet, in detail, the arguments by 
which he supports the proposition, that the essential constitutions of the Sciences, 
justify the order in which M. Comte places them. It will suffice to refer to the 
foregoing pages, and to the pages which are to follow, as containing the defini- 
tions of those fundamental characteristics which demand the grouping of the 
Sciences in the way pointed out. As already shown, and as will be shown still 
more clearly by and bye, the radical differences of constitution among the 
Sciences, necessitate the colligation of them into the three classes — Abstract, 
Abstract-Concrete, and Concrete. How irreconcilable is M. Comte's classification 
with these groups, will be at once apparent on inspection. It stands thus : — 

Mathematics (including rational Mechanics), partly Abstract, partly 

Abstract-Concrete. 

Astronomy Concrete. 

Physics Abstract-Concrete. 

Chemistry Abstract-Concrete. 

Biology Concrete. 

Sociology Concrete. 



12 

and invariable connexions — that between each kind of 
phenomenon and certain other kinds of phenomena, 
there exist uniform relations. This is a universal 
abstract truth — that there is an unchanging order 
among things in Space and Time. We come next 
to the several kinds of unchanging order, which, 
taken together, form the subjects of the second 
division of Abstract Science. Of this second divi- 
sion, the most general sub-division is that which 
deals with the natures of the connexions in Space 
and Time, irrespective of the terms connected. The 
conditions under which we may predicate a rela- 
tion of coincidence or proximity in Space and 
Time (or of non-coincidence or non-proximity) form 
the subject-matter of Logic. Here the natures and 
amounts of the terms between which the relations are 
asserted (or denied) are of no moment : the proposi- 
tions of Logic are independent of any qualitative 
or quantitative specification of the related things. 
The other sub-division has for its subject-matter, the 
relations between terms which are specified quanti- 
tatively but not qualitatively. The amounts of the 
related terms, irrespective of their natures, are here 
dealt with; and Mathematics is a statement of the 
laws of quantity considered apart from reality. Quan- 
tity considered apart from reality, is occupancy of 
Space or Time; and occupancy of Space or Time 
is measured by the number of coexistent or sequent 
positions occupied. That is to say, quantities can be 



13 

compared and the relations between them established, 
only by some direct or indirect enumeration of their 
component units; and the ultimate units into which 
all others are decomposable, are such occupied posi- 
tions in Space as can, by making impressions on 
consciousness, produce occupied positions in Time. 
Among units that are unspecified in their natures 
(extensive, protensive, or intensive), but are ideally 
endowed with existence considered apart from attri- 
butes, the quantitative relations that arise, are those 
most general relations expressed by numbers. Such 
relations fall into either of two orders, according as 
the units are considered simply as capable of filling 
separate places in consciousness, or according as they 
are considered as filling places that are not only sepa- 
rate, but equal. In the one case, we have that inde- 
finite calculus by which numbers of abstract existences, 
but not sums of abstract existence, are predicable. In 
the other case, we have that definite calculus by which 
both numbers of abstract existences and sums of 
abstract existence are predicable. Next comes that 
division of Mathematics which deals with the quanti- 
tative relations of magnitudes (or aggregates of units) 
considered as coexistent, or as occupying Space — the 
division called Geometry. And then we arrive at 
relations, the terms of which include both quantities 
of Time and quantities of Space — those in which 
times are estimated by the units of space traversed 
at a uniform velocity, and those in which equal 



14 



units of time being given, the spaces traversed with 
uniform or variable velocities are estimated. These 
Abstract Sciences, which are concerned exclusively 
with relations and with the relations of relations, may 
be grouped as shown in Table I. 

Passing from the Sciences that treat of the ideal or 
unoccupied forms of relations, and turning to the 
Sciences that treat of real relations, or the relations 
among realities, we come first to those Sciences which 
deal with realities, not as they are habitually mani^ 
fested to us, but with realities as manifested in their 
different modes, when these are artificially separated 
from one another. In the same way that the Abstract 
Sciences are ideal, relatively to the Abstract- Concrete 
and Concrete Sciences ; so the Abstract-Concrete 
Sciences are ideal, relatively to the Concrete Sciences. 
Just as Logic and Mathematics have for their object 
to generalize the laws of relation, qualitative and 
quantitative, apart from related things; so, Mecha- 
nics, Physics, Chemistry, etc., have for their object 
to generalize the laws of relation which different 
modes of Matter and Motion conform to, when seve- 
rally disentangled from those actual phenomena in 
which they are mutually modified. Just as the 
geometrician formulates the properties of lines and 
surfaces, independently of the irregularities and thick- 
nesses of lines and surfaces as they really exist; so, 
the physicist and the chemist formulate the mani- 




•aoNaios xovuxsav 



15 



festations of each mode of force, independently of 
the disturbances in its manifestations which other 
modes of force cause in every actual case. In works 
on Mechanics, the laws of motion are expressed with- 
out reference to friction and resistance of the medium. 
Not what motion ever really is, but what it would 
be if retarding forces were absent, is asserted. If any 
retarding force is taken into account, then the effect 
of this retarding force is alone contemplated : neglect- 
ing the other retarding forces. Consider, again, the 
generalizations of the physicist respecting molecular 
motion. The law that light varies inversely as the 
square of the distance, is absolutely true only 
when the radiation goes on from a point without 
dimensions, which it never does ; and it also assumes 
that the rays are perfectly straight, which they cannot 
be unless the medium differs from all actual media in 
being perfectly homogeneous. If the disturbing 
effects of changes of media are investigated, the 
formulas expressing the refractions take for granted 
that the new media entered are homogeneous ; which 
they never really are. Even when a compound 
disturbance is allowed for, as when the refraction 
undergone by light in traversing a medium of in- 
creasing density, like the atmosphere, is calculated, 
the calculation still supposes conditions that are un- 
naturally simple — it supposes that the atmosphere 
is not pervaded by heterogeneous currents, which 
it always is. Similarly with the inquiries of the 



16 



chemist. He does not take his substances as Nature 
supplies them. Before he proceeds to specify their 
respective properties, he purifies them — separates from 
each all trace of every other. Before ascertaining the 
specific gravity of a gas, he has to free this gas from 
the vapour of water, usually mixed with it. Before 
describing the properties of a salt, he guards against 
any error that may arise from the presence of an 
uncombined portion of the acid or base. And when 
he alleges of any element that it has a certain atomic 
weight, and unites with such and such equivalents 
of other elements, he does not mean that the results 
thus expressed are exactly the results of any one 
experiment; but that they are the results which, 
after averaging many trials, he concludes would be 
realized if absolute purity could be obtained, and 
if the experiments could be conducted without 
loss. His problem is to ascertain the laws of 
combination of molecules, not as they are actually 
displayed, but as they would be displayed in the 
absence of those minute interferences which cannot 
be altogether avoided. Thus all these Abstract-Con- 
crete Sciences have for their object, analytical inter- 
pretation. In every case it is the aim to decompose 
the phenomenon, and formulate its components apart 
from one another ; or some two or three apart from 
the rest. Wherever, throughout these Sciences, syn- 
thesis is employed, it is for the verification of analysis.* 

* I am indebted to Prof. Frankland for pointing out an objection that may be 



17 



The truths elaborated are severally asserted, not as 
truths exhibited by this or that particular object ; but 
as truths universally holding of Matter and Motion in 
their more general or more special forms, considered 
apart from particular objects, and particular places in 
space. 

The sub-divisions of this group of Sciences, may be 
drawn on the same principle as that on which the 
sub-divisions of the preceding group were drawn. 
Phenomena, considered as more or less involved 
manifestations of force, yield on analysis, certain 
laws of manifestation that are universal, and other 
laws of manifestation, which, being dependent on 
conditions, are not universal. Hence the Abstract- 
Concrete Sciences are primarily divisible into — the 
laws of force considered apart from its separate modes, 
and laws of force considered under each of its sepa- 
rate modes. And this second division of the Abstract- 
Concrete group, is sub-divisible after a manner essen- 
tially analogous. It is needless to occupy space by 



made to this statement. The production of new compounds by synthesis, has of 
late become an important branch of chemistry. According to certain known laws 
of composition, complex substances, which never before existed, are formed, and 
fulfil anticipations both as to their general properties and as to the proportions of 
their constituents — as proved by analysis. Here it may be said with truth, that 
analysis is used to verify synthesis. Nevertheless, the exception to the above 
statement is apparent only— not real. In so far as the production of new com- 
pounds is carried on merely for the obtainment of such new compounds, it is not 
Science but Art— the application of pre-established knowledge to the achievement 
of ends. The proceeding is a part of Science, only in so far as it is a means to 
the better interpretation of the order of Nature. And how does it aid the inter- 
pretation ? It does it only by verifying the pre-established conclusions respecting 
the laws of molecular combination ; or by serving further to explain them. That 
is to say, these syntheses, considered on their scientific side, have simply the pur- 
pose of forwarding the analysis a/the laws of chemical combination. 



18 



defining these several orders and genera of Sciences. 
Table TI. will sufficiently explain their relations. 

We come now to the third great group. We have 
done with the Sciences which are concerned only with 
the blank forms of relations under which Being is 
manifested to us. We have left behind the Sciences 
which, dealing with Being under its universal mode, 
and its several non-universal modes regarded as inde- 
pendent, treats the terms of its relations as simple and 
homogeneous, which they never are in Nature. There 
remain the Sciences which, taking these modes of 
Being as they are connected with one another, have for - 
the terms of their relations, those heterogeneous combi- 
nations of forces that constitute actual phenomena. 
The subject-matter of these Concrete-Sciences is the 
real, as contrasted with the wholly or partially ideal. 
It is their aim, not to separate and generalize apart 
the components of all phenomena ; but to explain each 
phenomenon as a product of these components. Their 
relations are not, like those of the simplest Abstract- 
Concrete Sciences, relations between one antecedent 
and one consequent, nor are they, like those of the 
more involved Abstract-Concrete Sciences, relations 
between some few antecedents cut off in imagination 
from all others, and some few consequents similarly 
cut off; but they are relations each of which has for 
its terms a complete plexus of antecedents and a com- 
plete plexus of consequents. This is manifest in the 













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19 



least involved Concrete Sciences. The astronomer 
seeks to explain the Solar System. He does not stop 
short after generalizing the laws of planetary move- 
ment, such as planetary movement would be did only 
a single planet exist ; but he solves this abstract-con- 
crete problem, as a step towards solving the concrete 
problem of the planetary movements as affecting one 
another. In astronomical language, "the theory of 
the Moon'' means an interpretation of the Moon's 
motions, not as determined simply by centripetal and 
centrifugal forces, but as perpetually modified by 
gravitation towards the Earth's equatorial protuber- 
ance, towards the Sun, and even towards Venus- 
forces daily varying in their amounts and combina- 
tions. Nor does the astronomer leave off when he has 
calculated what will be the position of a 'given body 
at a given time, allowing for all perturbing influences ; 
but he goes on to consider the effects produced by re- 
actions on the perturbing masses. And he further 
goes on to consider how these mutual perturbations 
of the planets cause, during a long- period, increasing 
deviations from a mean state ; and then how compen- 
sating perturbations cause continuous decrease in the 
deviations. That is, the goal towards which he ever 
strives, is a complete explanation of these complex 
planetary motions in their totality. Similarly with 
the geologist. Ho docs not take for his problem only 
those irregularities of the- Earth's crust that are 
worked by denudation; or only those which igneous 



20 



action causes. He does not seek simply to understand 
how sedimentary strata were formed; or how faults 
were produced; or how moraines originated, or how 
the beds of Alpine lakes were scooped out. But taking 
into account all agencies co-operating in endless and 
ever-varying combinations, he aims to interpret the 
entire structure of the Earth's crust. If he studies 
separately the actions of rain, rivers, glaciers, icebergs, 
tides, waves, volcanoes, earthquakes, etc. ; he does so 
that he may be better able to comprehend their joint 
actions as factors in geological phenomena: the object 
of his science being to generalize these phenomena in 
ail their involved connections, as parts of one whole. 
In like manner Biology is the elaboration of a com- 
plete theory of Life, in each and all of its involved 
manifestations. If different aspects of its phenomena 
are investigated apart — if one observer busies himself 
in classing organisms, another in dissecting them, 
another in ascertaining their chemical compositions, 
another in studying functions, another in tracing laws 
of modification; they are all, consciously or uncon- 
sciously, helping to work out a solution of vital 
phenomena in their entirety, both as displayed by 
individual organisms and by organisms at large. 
Thus, in these Concrete Sciences, the object is the 
converse of that which the Abstract-Concrete Sciences 
propose to themselves. In the one case we have 
analytical interpretation ; while in the other case we 
have synthetical interpretation. Instead of synthesis 



21 



being used merely to verify analysis ; analysis is here 
used only to aid synthesis. Not to formulate the 
factors of phenomena is now the object ; but to formu- 
late the phenomena resulting from these factors, under 
the various conditions which the Universe present. 

This third class of Sciences, like the other classes, is 
divisible into the universal and the non-universal. As 
there are truths which hold of all phenomena in their 
elements ; so there are truths which hold of all pheno- 
mena in their totalities. As force has certain ultimate 
laws common to its separate modes of manifestation, 
so in those combinations of its modes which constitute 
actual phenomena, we find certain ultimate laws that 
are conformed to in every case. These are the laws 
of the re-distribution of force. Since we can become 
conscious of a phenomenon only by some change 
wrought in us, every phenomenon necessarily implies 
re-distribution of force — change in the arrangements 
of matter and motion. Alike in molecular movements 
and the movements of masses, one great uniformity 
may be traced. A decreasing quantity of motion, 
sensible or insensible, always has for its concomitant 
an increasing aggregation of matter ; and, conversely, 
an increasing quantity of motion, sensible or insensible, 
has for its concomitant a decreasing aggregation of 
matter. Give to the molecules of any mass, more 
of that insensible motion which we call heat, and the 
parts of the mass become somewhat less closely aggre- 
gated. Add a further quantity of insensible motion, 



22 

and the mass so far disintegrates as to become liquid. 
Add still more insensible motion, and the mass dis- 
integrates so completely as to become gas ; which 
occupies a greater space with every extra quantity 
of insensible motion given to it. On the other hand, 
every loss of insensible motion by a mass, gaseous, 
liquid, or solid, is accompanied by a progressing 
integration of the mass. Similarly with sensible 
motions, be the bodies moved large or small. Aug- 
ment the velocities of the planets, and their orbits will 
enlarge — the Solar System would occupy a wider 
space. Diminish their velocities, and their orbits will 
lessen — the Solar System will contract, or become 
more integrated. And in like manner we see that 
every sensible motion on the Earth's surface, involves 
a partial disintegration of the moving body from the 
Earth ; while the loss of its motion is accompanied by 
the body's re -integration with the Earth. In all phe- 
nomena we have either an integration of matter and 
concomitant disintegration of motion ; or an integra- 
tion of motion and concomitant disintegration of 
matter. And where, as in living bodies, the processes 
of integration and disintegration of matter and motion 
are going on simultaneously, . there is an integration 
of matter proportioned to the disintegration of motion, 
and an integration of motion proportioned to the dis- 
integration of matter. These, then, are universal laws 
of that re-distribution of matter and motion everywhere 
going on — a re-distribution which results in Evolution 



23 

so long as the aggregation of matter and dissipation 
of motion predominate ; but which results in Dissolu- 
tion where there is a predominant aggregation of 
motion and dissipation of matter. Hence we have 
a division of Concrete Science which bears towards the 
other Concrete Sciences, a relation like that which Uni- 
versal Law of Eelation bears to Mathematics, and like 
that which Universal Mechanics (composition and reso- 
lution of forces) bears to Physics. We have a division of 
Concrete Science which generalizes those concomitants 
of this re-distribution that hold good among all orders 
of concrete objects — a division which explains why, 
along with a predominating integration of matter and 
disintegration of motion, there must be a change from 
an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, 
coherent heterogeneity; and why a reverse re-distri- 
bution of matter and motion, must be accompanied by 
a reverse structural change. Passing from this uni- 
versal Concrete Science, to the non-universal Concrete 
Sciences ; we find that these are primarily divisible 
into the Science which deals with the re-distributions 
of matter and motion among the masses in space, con- 
sequent on their mutual actions as wholes ; and the 
science which deals with the re -distributions of matter 
and motion consequent on the mutual actions of the 
molecules in each mass. And of these equally general 
Sciences, this last is re-divisible into the Science which 
is limited to the concomitants of re- distribution among 
the molecules of each mass when regarded as mde- 



24 



pendent, and the Science which takes into acconnt the 
molecular motion received by radiation from other 
masses. But these sub -divisions, and their sub-sub- 
divisions, will be best seen in the annexed Table III. 

That these great groups of Sciences and their re- 
spective sub-groups, fulfil the definition of a true 
classification given at the outset, is, I think, tolerably 
manifest. The subjects of inquiry included in each 
primary division, have essential attributes in common 
with one another, which they have not in common 
with any of the subjects contained in the other pri- 
mary divisions; and they have, by consequence, a 
greater number of common attributes in which they 
severally agree with the colligated subjects, and dis- 
agree with the subjects otherwise colligated. Between 
Sciences which deal with relations apart from realities, 
and Sciences which deal with realities, the distinc- 
tion is the widest possible; since Being, in some or 
all of its attributes, is common to all Sciences of the 
second class, and excluded from all Sciences of the first 
class. The distinction between the empty forms of 
things and the things themselves, is a distinction 
which cannot be exceeded in degree. And when 
we divide the Sciences which treat of realities, into 
those which deal with their separate components and 
those which deal with their components as united, 
we make a profounder distinction than can exist be- 
tween the Sciences which deal with one or other order 






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25 



of the components, or than can exist between the 
Sciences which deal with one or other order of the 
things composed. The three groups of Sciences may 
be briefly defined as — laws of the forms; laws of 
the factors ; laws of the products. And when thus 
defined, it becomes manifest that the groups are 
so radically unlike in their natures, that there can 
be no transitions between them ; and that any 
Science belonging to one of the groups must be 
quite incongruous with the Sciences belonging to 
either of the other groups, if transferred. How 
fundamental are the differences between them, will be 
further seen on considering their functions. The first, 
or abstract group, is instrumental with respect to both 
the others ; and the second, or abstract-concrete group, 
is instrumental with respect to the third or concrete 
group. An endeavour to invert these functions will 
at once show how essential is the difference of 
character. The second and third groups supply 
subject-matter to the first, and the third supplies 
subject-matter to the second; but none of the truths 
which constitute the third group are of any use as 
solvents of the problems presented by the second 
group ; and none of the truths which the second 
group formulates can act as solvents of problems 
contained in the first group. Concerning the sub- 
divisions of these great groups, little remains to be 
added. That each of the groups, being co-extensive 
with all phenomena, contains truths that are universal 



26 



and others that are not universal, and that these must 
be classed apart, is obvious. And that the sub- 
divisions of the non-universal truths, are to be made in 
something like the manner shown in the tables, is 
proved by the fact that when the descriptive words 
are read from the root to the extremity of any branch, 
they form a definition of the Science constituting that 
branch. That the minor divisions might be other- 
wise arranged, and that better definitions of them 
might be given, is highly probable. They are here 
set down merely for the purpose of showing how this 
method of classification works out. 

I will only further remark, that the relations of the 
Sciences as thus represented, are still but imperfectly 
represented : their relations cannot be truly shown 
on a plane, but only in space of three dimensions. 
The three groups cannot rightly be put in linear 
order as they have here been. Since the first stands 
related to the third, not only indirectly through the 
second, but also directly — it is directly instrumental 
with respect to the third, and the third supplies it 
directly with subject-matter. Their relations can 
thus only be truly shown by a divergence from a 
common root on different sides, in such a way that 
each stands in juxta-position to the other two. And 
only by the like mode of arrangement, can the relations 
among the sub-divisions of each group be correctly 
represented. 



KEASONS FOB DISSENTING 



PROM THE 



PHILOSOPHY OF M. COMTE. 



While the preceding pages were passing through the 
press, there appeared in the Revue des Deux JKondes for 
February 15th, an article on a late work of mine — First 
Principles. To M. Auguste Laugel, the writer of this article, 
I am much indebted for the careful exposition he has made of 
some of the leading views set forth in that work ; and for the 
catholic and sympathetic spirit in which he has dealt with 
them. In one respect, however, M. Laugel conveys to his 
readers an erroneous impression — an impression doubtless 
derived from what appears to him adequate evidence, and 
doubtless expressed in perfect sincerity. M. Laugel describes 
me as being, in part, a follower of M. Comte. After describing 
the influence of M. Comte as traceable in the works of some 
other English writers, naming especially Mr. Mill and Mr. 
Buckle, he goes on to say that this influence, though not 
avowed, is easily recognizable in the work he is about to 
make known ; and in several places throughout his review, 
there are remarks having the same implication. I greatly 
regret having to take exception to anything said by a critic 
so candid and so able. But the Revue des Deux Morldes cir- 
culates widely in England, as well as elsewhere ; and finding 
that there exists in some minds, both here and in America, 
an impression similar to that entertained by M. Laugel — 
an impression likely to be confirmed by his statement — it 
appears to me needful to meet it, 



28 



Two causes of quite different kinds, have conspired to diffuse 
the erroneous belief that M. Comte is an accepted exponent 
of scientific opinion ? His bitterest foes and his closest 
friends, have unconsciously joined in propagating it. On the 
one hand, M. Comte having designated by the term " Positive 
Philosophy" all that definitely- established knowledge which 
men of science have been gradually organizing into a cohe- 
rent body of doctrine ; and having habitually placed this in 
opposition to the incoherent body of doctrine defended by 
theologians ; it has become the habit of the theological party 
to think of the antagonist scientific party, under the title 
of " positivists." And thus, from the habit of calling 
them " positivists," there has grown up the assumption 
that they call themselves " positivists," and that they are 
the disciples of M. Comte. On the other hand, those who 
have accepted M. Comte's system, and believe it to be 
the philosophy of the future, have naturally been prone 
to see everywhere the signs of its progress ; and wherever 
they have found opinions in harmony with it, have ascribed 
these opinions to the influence of its originator. It is always 
the tendency of discipleship to magnify the effects of the 
master's teachings ; and to credit the master with all the 
doctrines he teaches. In the minds of his followers, M. 
Comte's name is associated with scientific thinking, which, 
in many cases, they first understood from his exposition of it. 
Influenced as they inevitably are by this association of ideas, 
they are reminded of M. Comte wherever they meet with 
thinking which corresponds, in some marked way, to M. 
Comte' s description of scientific thinking ; and hence are apt 
to imagine him as introducing into other minds, the con- 
ceptions which he introduced into their minds. Such im- 
pressions are, however, in most cases quite unwarranted. 
That M. Comte has given a general exposition of the doctrine 
and method elaborated by Science, is true. But it is not true 
that the holders of this doctrine and followers of this method, 



29 



are disciples of M. Comte. Neither their modes of inquiry 
nor their views concerning human knowledge in its nature 
and limits, are appreciably different from what they were 
before. If they are " positivists," it is in the sense that all men 
of science have been more or less consistently "positivists;" 
and the applicability of M. Comte's title to them, no more 
makes them his disciples, than does its applicability to 
men of science who lived and died before M. Comte wrote, 
make these his disciples. M. Comte himself by no means 
claims that which some of his adherents are apt, by impli- 
cation, to claim for him. He says : — "II y a, sans doute, 
beaucoup d'analogie entre ma philosophie positive et ce 
que les savans anglais entendent, depuis JSTewton surtout, 
par philosophie naturelle ;" (see Avertissement) and further 
on he indicates the " grand mouvement imprime a Tesprit 
humain, il y a deux siecles, par Taction combinee des 
preceptes de Bacon, des conceptions de Descartes, et des de- 
couvertes de Galilee, comme le moment ou Tesprit de la 
philosophie positive a commence a se prononcer dans 
le monde." That is to say, the general mode of thought 
and way of interpreting phenomena, which M. Comte calls 
" Positive Philosophy," he recognizes as having been growing 
for two centuries ; as having reached, when he wrote, a 
marked development ; and as being the heritage of all men of 
science. 

That which M. Comte proposed to do, was to give scientific 
thought and method a more definite embodiment and organi- 
zation ; and to apply it to the interpretation of classes 
of phenomena not previously dealt with in a scientific 
manner. The conception was a great one ; and the endea- 
vour to work it out was worthy of sympathy and applause. 
Some such conception was entertained by Bacon. He, too, 
aimed at the organization of the sciences ; he, too, held that 
" Physics is the mother of all the sciences ;" he, too, held 
that the sciences can be advanced only by combining them, 



30 



and saw the nature of the required combination ; he, too, 
held that moral and civil philosophy could not flourish when 
separated from their roots in natural philosophy ; and thus 
he, too, had some idea of a social science growing out of 
physical science. But the state of knowledge in his day pre- 
vented any advance beyond the general conception : indeed, 
it was marvellous that he should have advanced so far. In- 
stead of a vague, undefined conception, M. Comte has pre- 
sented the world with a defined and highly-elaborated 
conception. In working out this conception he has shown 
remarkable breadth of view, great originality, immense fer- 
tility of thought, unusual powers of generalization. Con- 
sidered apart from the question of its truth, his system of 
Positive Philosophy is a vast achievement. But after ac- 
cording to M. Comte high admiration for his conception, for 
his effort to realize it, and for the faculty he has shown in 
the effort to realize it, there remains the inquiry — Has he 
succeeded ? A thinker who re-organizes the scientific method 
and knowledge of his age, and whose re-organization is 
accepted by his successors, may rightly be said to have such 
successors for his disciples. But successors who accept this 
method and knowledge of his age, minus his re-organization, 
are certainly not his disciples. How then stands the case 
with M. Comte ? There are some few who receive his 
doctrines with but little reservation ; and these are his dis- 
ciples truly so called. There are others who regard with 
approval certain of his leading doctrines, but not the rest : 
these we may distinguish as partial adherents. There 
are others who reject all his distinctive doctrines ; and these 
must be classed as his antagonists. The members of this 
class stand substantially in tho same position as they would 
have done had he not written. Declining his re-organ- 
ization of scientific doctrine, they possess this scientific 
doctrine in its pre-existing state, as the common heritage 
bequeathed by the past to tho present ; and their adhesion to 



31 

this scientific doctrine in no sense implicates with M. Comte. 
In this class stand the great body of men of science. And 
in this class I stand myself. 

Coming thus to the personal part of the question, let me 
first specify those great general principles on which M. 
Comte is at one with preceding thinkers ; and on which I am 
at one with M. Comte. 

All knowledge is from experience, holds M. Comte ; and 
this I also hold — hold it, indeed, in a wider sense than M. 
Comte : since, not only do I believe that all the ideas acquired 
by individuals, and consequently all the ideas transmitted by 
past generations; are thus derived ; but I also contend that 
the very faculties by which they are acquired, are the pro- 
ducts of accumulated and organized experiences received by 
ancestral races of beings (see Principles of Psychology). But 
the doctrine that all knowledge is from experience, is not 
originated by M. Comte; nor is it claimed by him. He 
himself says — " Tous les bons esprits repetent, depuis Bacon, 
qu'il n'y a de connaissances reelle que celles qui reposent sur 
des faites observes." And the elaboration and definite esta- 
blishment of this doctrine, has been the special characteristic 
of the English school of Psychology. !Nor am I aware that 
M. Comte, accepting this doctrine, has done anything to 
make it more certain, or give it greater definiteness. Indeed it 
was impossible for him to do so ; since he repudiates that part 
of mental science by which alone this doctrine can be proved. 

It is a further belief of M. Comte, that all knowledge is 
phenomenal or relative ; and in this belief I entirely agree. 
But no one alleges that the relativity of all knowledge was 
first enunciated by M. Comte. Among others who have 
more or less consistently held this truth, Sir William Hamil- 
ton enumerates, Protagoras, Aristotle, St. Augustin, Boethius, 
Averroes, Albertus Magnus, Gerson, Leo Hebroous, Melanc- 
thon, Scaliger, Francis Piccolomini, Giordano Bruno, Cam- 



32 



panella, Bacon, Spinoza, Newton, Kant. And Sir William 
Hamilton, in his " Philosophy of the Unconditioned," first 
published in 1829, has given a scientific demonstration of this 
belief. Receiving it in common with other thinkers, from 
preceding thinkers, M. Comte has not, to my knowledge, 
advanced this belief. Nor indeed could he advance it, for 
the reason already given — he denies the possibility of that 
analysis of thought which discloses the relativity of all 
cognition. 

M. Comte reprobates the interpretation of different classes 
of phenomena by assigning metaphysical entities as their 
causes ; and I coincide in the opinion that the assumption 
of such separate entities, though convenient, if not indeed 
necessary, for purposes of thought, is, scientifically con- 
sidered, illegitimate. This opinion is, in fact, a corollary 
from the last ; and must stand or fall with it. But like the 
last it has been held with more or less consistencj' for gene- 
rations. M. Comte himself quotes Newton's favorite saying 
— " ! Physics, beware of Metaphysics !" Neither to this 
doctrine, any more than to the preceding doctrines, has M. 
Comte given a firmer basis. He has simply re- asserted it ; 
and it was out of the question for him to do more. In this 
case, as in the others, his denial of subjective psycholog)^ 
debarred him from proving that these metaphysical entities are 
mere symbolic conceptions which do not admit of verification. 

Lastly, M. Comte believes in invariable natural laws — 
absolute uniformities of relation among phenomena. But 
very many before him have believed in them too. Long 
familiar even beyond the bounds of the scientific world, the 
proposition that there is an unchanging order in things, has, 
within the scientific world, held, for generations, the position 
of an established postulate : by some men of science recog- 
nized only as holding of inorganic phenomena ; but recog- 
nized by other men of science, as universal. And M. Comte, 
accepting this doctrine from the past, has left it substantially 



33 

as it was. Though lie has asserted new uniformities, I do 
not think scientific men will admit that he has so demonstrated 
them, as to make the induction more certain ; nor has he 
deductively established the doctrine, by showing that uni- 
formity of relation is a necessary corollary from the per- 
sistence of force, as may readily be shown. 

These, then, are the pre-established general truths with 
which M. Comte sets out — truths which cannot be regarded 
as distinctive of his philosophy. " But why," it will perhaps 
be asked, "is it needful to point out this ; seeing that no 
instructed reader supposes these truths to be peculiar to M. 
Comte?" I reply that though no disciple of M. Comte 
would deliberately claim them for him ; and though no 
theological antagonist at all familiar with science and philo- 
phy, supposes M. Comte to be the first propounder of them ; 
yet there is so strong a tendency to associate any doctrines 
with the name of a conspicuous recent exponent of them, 
that false impressions are produced, even in spite of better 
knowledge. Of the need for making this reclamation, 
definite proof is at hand. In the, No. of the Revue des Deux 
Mondes named at the commencement, may be found, on p. 936, 
the words — " Toute religion, comme toute philosophic, a la 
pretention de donner une explication de Tunivers. La 
philosophie qui s'appelle positive se distingue de toutes les 
philosophies et de toutes les religions en ce qu'elle a renonce 
a cette ambition de l'esprit humain ;" and the remainder of 
the paragraph is devoted to explaining the doctrine of the 
relativity of knowledge. The next paragraph begins — 
" Tout imbu de ces idees, que nous exposons sans les discuter 
pour le moment, M. Spencer divise, etc." Now this is one 
of those collocations of ideas which tends to create, or to 
strengthen, the erroneous impression I would dissipate. I do 
not for a moment suppose that M. Laugel intended to say 
that these ideas which he describes as ideas of the " Positive 
Philosophy," are peculiarly the ideas of M. Comte. But 

S 



34 



little as lie probably intended it, bis expressions suggest tbis 
conception. In tbe minds of botb disciples and antagonists, 
"the Positive Philosophy" means tbe philosophy of M. 
Comte ; and to be imbued with the ideas of " the Positive 
Philosophy' ' means to be imbued with the ideas of M. Comte 
— to have received these ideas from M. Comte. After what 
has been said above, I need scarcely repeat that the con- 
ception thus inadvertently suggested, is a wrong one. M. 
Comte's brief enunciations of these general truths, gave me 
no clearer apprehensions of them than I had before. Such 
clarifications of ideas on these ultimate questions, as I can 
trace to any particular teacher, I owe to Sir William 
Hamilton. 

From the principles which M. Comte held in common with 
many preceding and contemporary thinkers, let us pass now 
to the principles that are distinctive of his system. Just as 
entirely as I agree with M. Comte on those cardinal doctrines 
which we jointly inherit ; so entirely do I disagree with him 
on those cardinal doctrines which he propounds, and which 
determine the organization of his philosophy. The best way 
of showing this will be to compare, side by side, the — 

Propositions held by x> ... 7 - ■, T r 7J 

M C t Propositions which I hold, 

"...chaeune de nos con- The progress of our conceptions, 

ceptions principales, chaque and of each branch of knowledge, is 

branche de nos connaissan- from beginning to end intrinsically 

ces, passe successivement alike. There are not three methods 

par trois etats theoriques of philosophizing radically opposed; 

differens: l'etat the ologique, but one method of philosophizing 

ou fictif ; l'etat metaphy- which remains, in essence, the same, 

sique, ou abstrait ; l'etat At first, and to the last, the conceived 

scientifique, ou positif. En causal agencies of phenomena, have a 

d'autres termes, l'esprit hu- degree of generality corresponding to 

main, par sa nature, em- the width of the generalizations 

ploie successivement dans which experiences have determined ; 

chaeune de scs recherches and they change just as gradually as 

trois methodes de philoso- experiences accumulate. The inte- 



35 



pher, dont le caractere est 
essentiellement different et 
meme radicalement oppose : 
d'abord la methode theolo- 
gique, ensuite la methode 
metaphysique, et enfin la 
methode Dositive." p. 3. 



gration of causal agencies, originally- 
thought of as multitudinous and 
local, but finally believed to be one 
and universal, is a process which in- 
volves the passing through all inter- 
mediate steps between these extremes; 
and any appearance of stages can be 
but superficial. Supposed concrete 
and individual causal agencies, co- 
alesce in the mind as fast as groups 
of phenomena are assimilated, or seen 
to be similarly caused. Along with 
their coalescence, comes a greater ex- 
tension of their individualities, and 
a concomitant loss of distinctness in 
their individualities. Gradually, by 
continuance of such coalescences, 
causal agencies become, in thought, 
diffused and indefinite. And even- 
tually, without any change in the 
nature of the process, there is reached 
the consciousness of a universal causal 
agency, which cannot be conceived.* 

As the progress of thought is one, 
so is the end one. There are not 
three possible terminal conceptions ; 
but only a single terminal conception. 
When the theological idea of the 
providential action of one being, is 
developed to its ultimate form, by the 
absorption of all independent second- 
ary agencies, it becomes the conception 
of a being immanent in all pheno- 
mena ; and the reduction of it to this 
state, implies the fading-away, in 
thought, of all those anthropomorphic 



" Le systeme theologique 
est parvenu a la plus haute 
perfection dont il soit sus- 
ceptible, quand il a substi- 
tue Taction providentielle 
d'un etre unique au jeu 
varie des nombreuses divi- 
nites independantes qui a- 
vaient ete imaginees primi- 
tivement. De meme, le 
dernier terme du systeme 
metaphysique consiste a 
concevoir, au lieu des dif- 
fe rentes en titesparticulieres, attributes by which the aboriginal 

* A clear illustration of this process, is furnished by the recent mental inte- 
gration of Heat, Light, Electricity, etc., as modes of molecular motion. If we 
go a step hack, we see that the modern conception of Electricity, resulted from 
the integration in consciousness, of the two forms of it evolved in the galvanic 
battery and in the electric-machine. And going hack to a still earlier stage, we 
see how the conception of statical electricity, arose by the coalescence in thought, 
of the previously-separate forces manifested in rubbed amber, in rubbed glass, and 
in lightning. With such illustrations before him, no one can, I think, doub! 
that the process has been the same from the beginning. 



36 



une seule grande entite ge- 
nerate, la nature, envisage e 
comme la source unique de 
tous les phenomenes. Pa- 
reillement, la perfection du 
systeme positif, vers laquelle 
il tend sans cesse, quoiqu'il 
soit tres-probable qu'il ne 
doive jamais l'atteindre, 
serait de pouvoir se repre- 
sentor tous les divers phe- 
nomenes observables comme 
des cas particuliers d'un 
seul fait general, tel que 
celui de la gravitation, par 
exemple." p. 5. 



"...la perfection du sys- 
teme positif, vers laquelle 
il tend sans cesse, quoiqu'il 
soit tres-probable qu'il ne 
doive jamais l'atteindre, 
serait de pouvoir se repre- 
sentor tous les divers phe- 
nomenes observables comme 
des cas particuliers d'un 
seul fait general, p. 5 ... 
. . . considerant comme ab- 
solument inaccessible, et 
vide de sens pour nous la 
recherche de ce qu'on ap- 
pelle les causes, soit pre- 
mieres, soit finales." p. 14. 



idea was distinguished. The alleged 
last term of the metaphysical system 
— the. conception of a single great 
general entity, nature, as the source 
of all phenomena — is a conception 
identical with the previous one : the 
consciousness of a single source which, 
in coming to be regarded as universal, 
ceases to be regarded as conceivable, 
differs in nothing but name from the 
consciousness of one being, mani- 
fested in all phenomena. And simi- 
larly, that which is described as the 
ideal state of science — the power to 
represent all observable phenomena 
as particular cases of a single general 
fact, implies the postulating of some 
ultimate existence of which this 
single fact is alleged ; and the postu- 
lating of this ultimate existence, 
involves a state of consciousness in- 
distinguishable from the other two. 

Though along with the extension 
of generalizations, and concomitant 
integration of conceived causal agen- 
cies, the conceptions of causal agencies 
grow more indefinite ; and though as 
they gradually coalesce into a uni- 
versal causal agency, they cease to be 
representable in thought, and are 
no longer supposed to be comprehen- 
sible ; yet the consciousness of cause 
remains as dominant to the last as it 
was at first; and can never be got 
rid of. The consciousness of cause 
can be abolished only by abolishing 
consciousness itself* (First Princi- 
ples, § 26.) 



* Possibly it will be said that M. Comte himself admits, that what he calls the 
perfection of the positive system, will probably never be reached ; and that what 
he condemns is the inquiry into the natures of causes and not the general recog- 
nition of cause. To the first of these allegations, I reply tnat, as I understand 
M. Comte, the obstacle to the perfect realization of the positive philosophy is the 
impossibility of carrying generalization so far as to reduce all particular facts to 



37 



;< Ce n'est pas aux lec- 
teurs de cet ouvrage que je 
croirai jamais devoir prou- 
ver que les idees gouvernent 
et bouleversent le monde, 
ou, en d'autres termes, que 
tout le mecanisme social 
repose finalement sur des 
opinions. lis savent surtout 
que la grande crise politique 
et morale des societes ac- 
tuelles tient, en derniere 
analyse, a l'anarchie intel- 
lectuelle. ,, p. 48.* 



Ideas do not govern and overthrow 
the world : the world is governed or 
overthrown by feelings, to which 
ideas serve only as guides. The 
social mechanism does not rest finally 
upon opinions; but almost wholly up- 
on character. Not intellectual anar- 
chy, but moral antagonism, is the 
cause of political crises. All social 
phenomena are produced by the to- 
tality of human emotions and beliefs : 
of which the emotions are mainly 
pre-determined, while the beliefs are 
mainly post-determined. Men's de- 
sires are chiefly inherited ; but their 
beliefs are chiefly acquired, and depend 
on surrounding conditions ; and the 
most important surrounding condi- 
tions depend on the social state which 
the prevalent desires have produced. 
The social state at any time existing, 
is the resultant of all the ambitions, 
self-interests, fears, reverences, in- 
dignations, sympathies, etc., of an- 
cestral citizens and existing citizens. 
The ideas current in this social state, 
must, on the average, be congruous 
with the feelings of citizens ; and 
therefore, on the average, with the 
social state these feelings have pro- 
cases of one general fact — not the impossibility of excluding the consciousness of 
cause. And to the second allegation I reply, that the essential principle of his 
philosophy, is an avowed ignoring of cause altogether. For if it is not, what be- 
comes of his alleged distinction between the perfection of the positive system and the 
perfection of the metaphysical system ? And here let me point out that, by affirm- 
ing exactly the opposite to that which M. Comte thus affirms, I am excluded 
from the positive school. If his own definition of positivism is to be taken, 
then, as I hold that what he defines as positivism is an absolute impossibility, 
it is clear that I cannot be what he calls a positivist. 

* A friendly critic alleges that M. Comte is not fairly represented by this 
quotation, and that he is blamed by his biographer, M. Littre, for his too-great 
insistance on feeling as a motor of humanity. If in his " Positive Politics," 
which I presume is here referred to, M. Comte abandons his original position, so 
much the better. But I am here dealing with Avffat is known as "the Positive 
Philosophy ; " and that the passage above quoted does not misrepresent it, is proved 
both by the fact that this doctrine is re-asserted at the commencement of the 
Sociology, and by the fact that M. Comte's adherent, Mr. Buckle, re-asserts it 
in full. 



38 



" ... je ne dois pas negliger 
d'indiquer d'avance, comme 
une propriete essentielle de 
l'echelle encyclopedique que 
je vais proposer, sa con- 
formite generale avec l'en- 
serable de l'histoire scien- 
tifique; en ce sens, que, 
malgre la simultaneity reelle 
et continue du developpe- 
ment des diffe rentes sciences, 
celles qui seront classees 
comme anterieures seront, 
en effet, plus anciennes et 
constamment plus avancees 
que celles presentees comme 

post^rieures." p. 84 

. . , # ./'Cet ordre est de- 
termine par le degre de sim- 
plicity, ou, ce qui revient 
au meme, par le degre de 
gdneralite des ph^nomenes." 
p. 87. 



duced. Ideas wholly foreign to this 
social state cannot be evolved, and if 
introduced from without, cannot get 
accepted — or, if accepted, die out 
when the temporary phase of feeling 
which caused their acceptance, ends. 
Hence, though advanced ideas when 
once established, act upon society 
and aid its further advance ; yet the 
establishment of such ideas depends 
on the fitness of the society for re- 
ceiving them. Practically, the popu- 
lar character and the social state, 
determine what ideas shall be cur- 
rent; instead of the current ideas 
determining the social state and the 
character. The modification of men's 
moral natures, caused by the continu- 
ous discipline of social life, which 
adapts them more and more to social 
relations, is therefore the chief proxi- 
mate cause of social progress. (Social 
Statics, chap, xxx.) 

The order in which the generaliza- 
tions of science are established, is 
determined by the frequency and im- 
pressiveness with which different 
classes of relations are repeated in 
conscious experience; and this de- 
pends, partly on the directness with 
which personal welfare is affected; 
partly on the conspicuousness of one or 
loth the plienomena between which a 
relation is to be perceived; partly on the 
absolute frequency with which the re- 
lations occur ; partly on their relative 
frequency of occurrence; partly on 
their degree of simplicity ; and partly 
on their degree of abstractness. {First 
Principles, § 36). 



39 



"En r&ultat definitif, la 
mathematique, l'astronomie, 
la physique, la chimie, la 
physiologie, et la physique 
sociale ; telle est la formule 
enclyopedique qui, parmi le 
tres-grand nombre de clas- 
sifications que comportent 
les six sciences fondamen- 
tales, est seule logiquement 
conform e a la hierarchie 
naturelle et invariable des 
phenomenes," p. 115. 

" On conceit, en effet, que 
V etude rationelle de chaque 
science fondamentale exi- 
geant la culture prealable 
de toutes celles qui la pre- 
cedent dans notre hierarchie 
enclyopedique, n'a pu faire 
de progres reels et prendre 
son veritable caractere, qu' 
apres un grand developpe- 
ment des sciences ante- 
rieures relatives a, des phe- 
nomenes plus generaux, plus 
abstraits, moins compliques, 
et independans des autres. 
C'est done dans cet ordre 
que la progression, quoique 
simultanee, a du avoir lieu." 
p. 100. 



The sciences as arranged in this 
succession specified by M. Comte, do 
not logically conform to the natural 
and invariable hierarchy of pheno- 
mena; and there is no serial order 
whatever in which they can be placed, 
which represents either their logical 
dependence or the dependence of phe- 
nomena. (See Genesis of Science, 
and foregoing Essay.) 



The historical development of the 
sciences has not taken place in this 
serial order; nor in any other serial 
order. There is no "true filiation 
of the sciences." Erom the begin- 
ning, the abstract sciences, the 
abstract-concrete sciences, and the 
concrete sciences, have progressed to- 
gether : the first solving problems 
which the second and third present- 
ed, and growing only by the solution 
of the problems ; and the second 
similarly growing by joining the first 
in solving the problems of the third. 
All along there has been a continuous 
action and reaction between the three 
great classes of sciences — an advance 
from concrete facts to abstract facts, 
and then an application of such ab- 
stract facts to the analysis of new 
orders of concrete facts. (See Genesis 
of Science.) 



Such then are the organizing principles of M. Comte's 
philosophy. Leaving out of his "Exposition" those pre- 
established general doctrines which are the common property 
of modern thinkers ; these are the general doctrines which 
remain — these are the doctrines which fundamentally dis- 
tinguish his system. From every one of them I dissent. 
To each proposition I oppose either a widely-different pro* 



40 



position, or a direct negation ; and I not only do it now, but 
have done it from the time when I became acquainted with 
his writings. This rejection of his cardinal principles should, 
I think, alone suffice ; but there are sundry other views 
of his, some of them largely characterizing his system, 
which I equally reject Let us glance at them. 



How organic beings have 
originated, is an inquiry 
which M. Comte deprecates 
as a useless speculation : as- 
serting, as he does, that 
species are immutable. 



M. Comte contends that 
of what is commonly known 
as mental science, all that 
most important part which 
consists of the subjective 
analysis of our ideas, is an 
impossibility. 

M. Comte' s ideal of so- 
ciety is one in which govern- 
ment is developed to the 
greatest extent — in which 
class-functions are far more 
under conscious public regu- 
lation than now — in which 
hierarchical organization 
with unquestioned authority 
shall guide everything — in 
which the individual life 
shall be subordinated in the 
greatest degree to the social 
life. 



This inquiry, I believe, admits of 
answer, and will be answered. That 
division of Biology which concerns 
itself with the origin of species, I 
hold to be the supreme division, to 
which all others are subsidiary. For 
on the verdict of Biology on this 
matter, must wholly depend our con- 
ception of human nature, past, pre- 
sent, and future ; our theory of the 
mind ; and our theory of society. 

I have very emphatically expressed 
my belief in a subjective science of 
the mind, by writing a Principles of 
Psychology t one half of which is sub- 
jective. 



That form of society towards which 
we are progressing, I hold to be one 
in which government will be reduced 
to the smallest amount possible, and 
freedom increased to the greatest 
amount possible — one in which 
human nature will have become so 
moulded by social discipline into fit- 
ness for the social state, that it will 
need little external restraint, but will 
be self-restrained — one in which the 
citizen will tolerate no interference 
with his freedom, save that which 
maintains the equal freedom of others 
— one in which the spontaneous co- 
operation which has developed our 
industrial system, and is now develop- 



41 

ing it with increasing rapidity, will 
produce agencies for the discharge of 
nearly all social functions, and will 
leave to the primary govermental 
agency nothing beyond the function 
of maintaining those conditions to 
free action, which make such spon- 
taneous co-operation possible — one in 
which individual life will thus be 
pushed to the greatest extent consis- 
tent with social life; and in which 
social life will have no other end than 
to maintain the completest sphere for 
individual life 



M. Comte, not including 
in his philosophy the con- 
sciousness of a cause mani- 
fested to us in all phe- 
nomena, and yet holding 
that there must be a reli- 
gion, which must have an 
object, takes for his object 
—Humanity. "This Col- 
lective Life (of Society) A is 
in Comte' s system the Mre 
Supreme ; the only one we 
can know, therefore the only 
one we can worship." 



I conceive, on the other hand, that 
the object of religious sentiment will 
ever continue to be, that which it has 
ever been — the unknown source of 
things. "While the forms under which 
men are conscious of the unknown 
source of things, may fade away, 
the substance of the consciousness is 
permanent. Beginning with causal 
agents conceived as imperfectly 
known ; progressing to causal agents 
conceived as less known and less 
knowable; and coming at last to a 
universal causal agent posited as 
not to be known at all ; the religious 
sentiment must ever continue to oc- 
cupy itself with this universal causal 
agent. Having in the course of 
evolution, come to have for its object 
of contemplation, the Infinite Un- 
knowable, the religious sentiment can 
never again (unless by retrogression) 
take a Finite Knowable, like Human- 
ity, for its object of contemplation. 



Here, then, are sundry other points, all of them important, 
and the last two supremely important, on which I am 
diametrically opposed to M. Comte ; and did space permit, 
I could add many others. Eadically differing from him as I 
thus do, in everything distinctive of his philosophy; and 



42 



having invariably expressed my dissent, publicly and 
privately, from the time I became acquainted with his 
writings ; it may be imagined that I have been not a little 
startled to find myself classed as one of the same school. 
That those who have read First Principles only, may have 
been betrayed into this error in the way above shown, by the 
ambiguous use of the phrase "Positive Philosophy," I can 
understand. But that any who are acquainted with my pre- 
vious writings, should suppose I have any general sympathy 
with M. Comte, save that implied by preferring proved facts 
to superstitions, astonishes me. 

It is true that, disagreeing with M. Comte, though I do, 
in all those fundamental views that are peculiar to him, 
I agree with him in sundry minor views. The doctrine that 
the education of the individual should accord in mode and 
arrangement with the education of mankind, considered 
historically, I have cited from him ; and have endeavoured 
to enforce it. I entirely concur in his opinion that there 
requires a new order of scientific men, whose function shall 
be that of co-ordinating the results arrived at by the rest. 
To him I believe I am indebted for the conception of a 
social consensus ; and when the time comes for dealing with 
this conception, I shall state my indebtedness. And I also 
adopt his word, Sociology. There are, I believe, in the part 
of his writings which I have read, various incidental thoughts 
of great depth and value ; and I doubt not that were I to 
read more of his writings, I should find many others.* It 
is very probable, too, that I have said (as I am told I have) 
some things which M. Comte had already said. It would be 
difficult, I believe, to find any two men who had no opinions 
in common. And it would be extremely strange if two men, 

* M. Comte's "Exposition" I read" in the original in 1853; and in two 
or three other places have referred to the original to get his exact •words. 
The Inorganic Physics, and the first chapter of the Biology, I read in Miss 
Martineau's condensed translation, when it appeared. The rest of M. Comte's 
views I know only through Mr. Lewes's outline, and through incidental references. 



43 



starting from the same general doctrines established by 
modern science, should traverse some of the same fields of 
inquiry, without their lines of thought having any points 
of intersection. But none of these minor agreements can be 
of much weight in comparison with the fundamental dis- 
agreements above specified. Leaving out of view that general 
community which we both have with the scientific thought 
of the age, the differences between us are essential, while 
the correspondences are non-essential. And I venture to 
think that kinship must be determined by essentials, and 
not by non-essentials.* 

Joined with the ambiguous use of the phrase "Positive 
Philosophy/' which has led to a classing with M. Comte 
of many men who either ignore or reject his distinctive 
principles, there has been one special circumstance that" has 
tended to originate and maintain this classing in my own 
case. The assumption of some relationship between M. Comte 
and myself, was unavoidably raised by the title of my first 
book — Social Statics. When that book was published, I was 
unaware that this title had been before used : had I 
known the fact, I should certainly have adopted an alternative 
title which I had in view.f If, however, instead of the title, 

* In his recent work, Auguste Comte et la Philosophie Positive, M. Littre, 
defending the Comtean classification of the sciences from the criticism I made 
upon it in the " Genesis of Science," deals with me wholly as an antagonist. 
The chapter he devotes to his reply, opens hy placing me in direct antithesis 
to the English adherents of Comte, named in the preceding chapter. 

f I "believed at the time, and have never doubted until now, that the choice 
of this title was absolutely independent of its previous use by M. Comte. While 
writing these pages, I have found reason to think the contrary. On referring to Social 
Statics, to see wbat were my views of social evolution in 1850, when M. Comte 
was to me but a name, I met with the following sentence : — " Social philosophy 
may be aptly divided (as political economy has been) into statics and dynamics." 
(p. 409). This I remembered to be a reference to a division which I had seen in 
the Political Economy of Mr. Mill. But why had I not mentioned Mr. Mill's name ? 
On referring to the first edition of his work, I found, at the opening of Book iv., 
this sentence : — "The three preceding parts include as detailed a view as the limits 
of this treatise permit, of what, by a happy generalization of a mathematical 
phrase, has heen called the Statics of the subject." Here was the solution of the 
question. The division had not been made hy Mr. Mill, but by some writer 
(on Political Economy I supposed) who was not named by him ; and whom I did 
not know. It is now manifest, however, that while I supposed I was giving 
a more extended use to this division, I was but returning to the original use 



44 



the work itself be considered, its irrelation to the philosopny 
of M. Comte, becomes abundantly manifest. There is decisive 
testimony on this point. In the North British Revieiu for 
August, 1851, a reviewer of Social Statics says — 

'* The title of this work, however, is a complete misnomer. 
According to all analogy, the phrase "Social Statics" should be 
used only in some such sense as that in which, as we have already 
explained, it is used by Comte, namely as designating a branch of 
inquiry whose end it is to ascertain the laws of social equilibrium 
or order, as distinct ideally from those of social movement or progress. 
Of this Mr. Spencer does not seem to have had the slightest notion, 
but to have chosen the name for his work only as a means of indi- 
cating vaguely that it proposed to treat of social concerns in a 
scientific manner." p. 321. 

Respecting M. Comte's application of the words statics 
and dynamics to social phenomena, now that I know what 
it is, I will only say that while I perfectly understand how, 
by a defensible extension of their mathematical meanings, 
the one may be used to indicate social functions in balance, 
and the other social functions out of balance, I am quite at a 
loss to understand how the phenomena of structure can be 
included in the one any more than in the other. But the 
two things which here concern me, are, first, to point out that 
I had not "the slightest notion" of giving Social Statics the 
meaning which M. Comte gave it ; and, second, to explain 
the meaning which I did give it. The units of any ag- 
gregate of matter, are in equilibrium when they severally 
act and re-act upon each other on all sides with equal forces. 
A state of change among them implies that there are forces 
exercised by some that are not counterbalanced by like 
forces exercised by others; and a state of rest implies the 
absence of such uncounterbalanced forces — implies, if the 
units are homogeneous, equal distances among them — 
implies a maintenance of their respective spheres of molecular 

which Mr. Mill had limited to his special topic. Another thing is, I think, 
tolerably manifest. As I evidently wished to point out my obligation to some 
unknown political economist, whose division I thought I :vas extending, I should 
have named him had I known who he was. And in that case should not have 
put this extension of the division as though it were new 



45 

motion. Similarly among the units of a society, the funda- 
mental condition to equilibrium, is, that the restraining forces , 
which the units exercise on each other, shall be balanced. 
If the spheres of action of some units are diminished by 
extension of the spheres of action of others, there necessarily 
results an unbalanced force which tends to produce political 
change in the relations of individuals ; and the tendency 
to change can cease, only when individuals cease to aggress 
on each other's spheres of action — only when there is 
maintained that law of equal freedom, which it was the 
purpose of Social Statics to enforce in all its consequences. 
Besides this totally-unlike conception of what constitutes 
Social Statics, the work to which I applied that title, is 
fundamentally at variance with M. Comte's teachings in 
almost everything. So far from alleging, as M. Comte does, 
that society is to be re-organized by philosophy ; it alleges 
that society is to be re-organized only by the accumulated 
effects of habit on character. Its aim is not the increase 
of authoritative control over citizens, but the decrease of it. 
A more pronounced individualism, instead of a more pro- 
nounced nationalism, is its ideal. So profoundly is my 
political creed at variance with the creed of M. Comte, that, 
unless I am misinformed, it has been instanced by a leading 
English disciple of M. Comte, as the creed to which he has 
the greatest aversion. One point of coincidence, however, 
is recognizable. The analogy between an individual organism 
and a social organism, which was held by Plato and by 
Hobbes, is asserted in Social Statics, as it is in the Sociology 
of M. Comte. Yery rightly, M. Comte has made this 
analogy the cardinal idea of this division of his philosophy. 
In Social Statics, the aim of which is essentially ethical, 
this analogy is pointed out incidentally, to enforce certain 
ethical considerations.; and is there obviously suggested 
partly by the definition of life which Coleridge derived from 
Schelling, and partly by the generalizations of physiologists 
there referred to (chap. xxx. §§. 12, 13, 16). Excepting 



46 



this incidental agreement, however, the contents of Social 
Statics are so wholly antagonistic to the philosophy of 
M. Comte, that, but for the title, the work would never, 
I think, have raised the remembrance of him — unless, indeed, 
by the association of opposites.* 

And now let me point out that which really has exercised 
a profound influence over my course of thought. The truth 
which Harvey's embryological inquiries first dimly indicated, 
which was more clearly perceived by Wolff and Goethe, and 
which was put into a definite shape by Yon Baer — the truth 
that all organic development is a change from a state of 
homogeneity to a state of heterogeneity — this it is from 
which very many of the conclusions which I now hold, 
have indirectly resulted. In Social Statics, there is every- 
where manifested a dominant belief in the evolution of man 
and of society. There is also manifested the belief that this 
evolution is in both cases determined by the incidence of 
conditions — the actions of circumstances. And there is 
further, in the sections above referred to, a recognition of 
the fact that organic and social evolutions, conform to the 
same law. Falling amid beliefs in evolutions of various 
orders, every where determined by natural causes (beliefs again 
displayed in the Theory of Population and in the Principles 
of Psychology) ; the formula of Yon Baer acted as an 
organizing principle. The extension of it to other kinds 
of phenomena than those of individual and social organiza- 

* Let me add that the conception developed in Social Statics, dates back to a 
series of letters on the " Proper Sphere of Government," published in the 
Nonconformist newspaper, in the latter half of 1842, and republished as a 
pamphlet in 1843. In these letters will be found, along with many crude ideas, 
the same belief in the conformity of social phenomena to unvariable laws ; the 
same belief in human progression as determined by such laws ; the same belief 
in the moral modification of men as caused by social discipline ; the same 
belief in the tendency of social arrangements "of themselves to assume 
a condition of stable equilibrium ;" the same repudiation of state-control over 
various departments of social life; the same limitation of state-action to the 
maintenance of equitable relations among citizens. The writing of Social Statics 
arose from a dissatisfaction with the basis on which the doctrines set forth in those 
letters were placed : the second half of that work is an elaboration of these 
doctrines ; and the first half a statement of the principles from which they are 
dcducible. 



47 

tion, is traceable through successive stages. It may be seen 
in the last paragraph of an essay on "The Philosophy of 
Style," published in October, 1852; again in an essay on 
"Manners and Fashion," published in April, 1854; and 
then, in a comparatively advanced form, in an essay on 
"Progess: its Law and Cause/' published in April, 1857. 
Afterwards, there came the recognition of the need for 
further limitation of this formula; next the inquiry into 
those general laws of force from which this universal trans- 
formation necessarily results ; next the deduction of these 
from the ultimate law of the persistence of force ; next the 
perception that there is everywhere a process of Dissolution 
complementary to that of Evolution ; and, finally, the deter- 
mination of the conditions (specified in the foregoing essay) 
under which Evolution and Dissolution respectively occur. 
The filiation of these results, is, I think, tolerably manifest. 
The process has been one of continuous development, set up 
by the addition of Yon Baer's law to a number of ideas that 
were in harmony with it. And I am not conscious of any 
other influences by which the process has been affected. 

It is possible, however, that there may have been influences 
of which I am not conscious ; and my opposition to M. 
Comte's system may have been one of them. The presenta- 
tion of antagonistic thoughts, often produces greater definite- 
ness and development of one's own thoughts. It is probable 
that the doctrines set forth in the essay on " The Genesis of 
Science," might never have been reached, had not my very 
decided dissent from M. Comte's conception, led me to work 
them out ; and but for this, I might not have arrived at the 
classification of the sciences exhibited in the foregoing essay. 
Very possibly there are other cases in which the stimulus of 
repugnance to M. Comte's views, may have aided in elaborat- 
ing my own views ; though I cannot call to mind any other 
cases. 

Let it by no means be supposed from all I have said, that 
I do not regard M. Comte's speculations as of great value. 



48 



True or untrue, his system as a whole, has doubtless produced 
important and salutary revolutions of thought in many 
minds; and will doubtless do so in many more. Doubtless, 
too, not a few of those who dissent from his general views, 
have been heathfully stimulated by the consideration of them. 
The presentation of scientific knowledge and method as a 
whole, whether rightly or wrongly co-ordinated, cannot have 
failed greatly to widen the conceptions of most of his readers. 
And he has done especial service by familiarizing men with 
the idea of a social science, based on the other sciences. 
Beyond which benefits resulting from the general character 
and scope of his philosophy, I believe that there are scattered 
through his pages, many large ideas that are valuable not 
only as stimuli, but for their actual truth. 

It has been by no means an agreeable task to make these 
personal explanations ; but it has seemed to me a task not to 
be avoided. Differing so profoundly as I do from M. Comte 
on all fundamental doctrines, save those which we inherit in 
common from the past ; it has become needful to dissipate 
the impression that I agree with him — needful to show that 
a large part of what is currently known as "positive 
philosophy/' is not "positive philosophy" in the sense of 
being peculiarly M. Comte's philosophy; and to show that 
beyond that portion of the so-called "positive philosophy" 
which is not peculiar to him, I dissent from it. 

And now at the close, as at the outset, let me express my 
great regret that these explanations should have been called 
forth by the statements of a critic who has treated me so liber- 
ally. Nothing will, I fear, prevent the foregoing pages from 
appearing like a very ungracious response to M. Laugel's 
sympathetically-written review. I can only hope that the 
gravity of the question at issue, in so far as it concerns 
myself, may be taken in mitigation, if not as a sufficient 
apology. 

March 12th, 1864. 



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EDUCATION: 

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1 Vol. 12mo. Price $1 25. 

Part I. What Knowledge is of Most Worth. 

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IV. Physical Education. 

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issues of the American Press.— Dr. John W. Draper. 

It is masterly and valuable beyond all other books on the theme. — Rev. T. Starr 
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These papers are clearly and gracefully written, and illustrate the author's fresh 
and vigorous spirit, his power of separating the essential from the accidental as well 
as his success in grasping the main features of the subject. — Atlantic Monthly. 

His book contains more good sense in a small compass, than any book on Educa- 
tion we have ever seen. — Rev. Dr. Hill, JPres. Harvard College. 

In breadth of philosophical view, for depth of research in all directions, and for 
surprising familiarity with the details of nearly every department of science, Mr. 
Spencer has no competitor among English writers on Education.— Prof. W. F. Phelps, 
Prin. N. J. Normal School. 

It is a mighty book.— Anson Smyth, State School Com. of Ohio. 

The most philosophical and able discussion of the principles of Education that has 
yet appeared. — D. H Cochran, Prin. N. T. State Normal School. 

It happily illustrates the importance of an intelligent knowledge of physical science 
as an element of education. I have read it with much pleasure and profit. — Prof. B. 
SilUman, Jr. 

The entire volume claims diligent study, and is replete with suggestions that inti- 
mately concern all parents and Educators. Its author is one of the great thinkers of 
the age. — North American Review. 

Its subjects are treated with profound ability and remarkable clearness of thought 
and extent of research. — N. Y. Observer. 

We think it the most important book on the education of children ever written. — 
American Agriculturist. 

Profound in analysis, practical in suggestion, and sagacious in theory. — Inde- 
pendent. 

It throws a rare light upon the importance of studying the natural unfolding of 
the powers, and ministering to them the proper food at the proper time. — Albion. 

Earely have we seen a book of more cogent reasoning than this. — N. Y. Evening 
Post. 



Works of Herbert Spencer published by D. Appleton & Co. 
A NEW SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

FIRST PRINCIPLES. 

1 Vol. Large 12mo. 515 Pages. Price $2 00. 

Contents : 
Part First. — The Unknowable. 

Chapter I. Religion and Science; II. Ultimate Religious Ideas; III. 
Ultimate Scientific Ideas; IY. The Relativity of all Knowledge; V. The 
Reconciliation. 

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I. Laws in General ; II. The Law of Evolution ; III. The same con- 
tinued ; rV. The Causes of Evolution ; Y. Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and 
Force ; YI. The Indestructibility of Matter ; VII. The Continuity of Motion ; 
YIH. The Persistence of Force ; IX. The Correlation and Equivalence of 
Forces; X. The Direction of Motion ; XI. The Rhythm of Motion; XII. The 
Conditions Essential to Evolution ; XILT. The Instability of the Homoge- 
neous ; XIY. The Multiplication of Effects ; XV. Differentiation and Inte- 
gration ; XYI. Equilibration ; XVII. Summary and Conclusion. 

In the first part of this work Mr. Spencer defines the province, limits, and 
relations of religion and science, and determines the legitimate scope of 
philosophy. 

In part second he unfolds those fundamental principles which have been 
arrived at within the sphere of the knowable ; which are true of all orders 
of phenonema, and thus constitute the foundation of all philosophy. The 
law of Evolution, Mr. Spencer maintains to be universal, and he has here 
worked it out as the basis of his system. 

These First Principles are the foundation of a system of Philosophy 
bolder, more elaborate, and comprehensive perhaps, than any other which 
has been hitherto designed in England. — British Quarterly Review. 

A work lofty in aim and remarkable in execution. — Cornhill Magazine. 

In the works of Herbert Spencer we have the rudiments of a positive 
Theology, and an immense step toward the perfection of the science of Psy- 
chology. — Christian Examiner. 

If we mistake not, in spite of the very negative character of his own re- 
sults, he has foreshadowed some strong arguments for the doctrine of a posi- 
tive Christian Theology. — New Englander. 

As far as the frontiers of knowledge, where the intellect may go, there is 
no living man whose guidance may more safely be trusted. — Atlantic 
Monthly. 



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THE CORRELATION AND CONSERVATION 



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HOLTZ. 

IV. — THE CONNECTION AND EQUIVALENCE OF 
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V.— ON THE CONSERVATION OF FORCE. By De. 
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VI.— ON THE CORRELATION OF PHYSICAL AND VI- 
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A SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS. 

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CONTENTS : 

American Notice of Spencer's New System of Philosophy. 
I. Progress : its Law and Cause. 
II. Manners and Fashion. 

III. The Genesis of Science. 

IV. The Physiology of Laughter. 

V. The Origin and Function of Music. 

VI. The Nebular Hypothesis. 

VII. Bain on the Emotions and the Will. 

VIII. Illogical Geology. . 

IX. The Development Hypothesis. 

X. The Social Organism. 

XI. Use and Beauty. 

XII. The Sources of Architectural Types. 

XIII. The Use of Anthropomorphism. 

These Essays constitute a body of massive and original thought upon a 
large variety of important topics, and will be read with pleasure by all who 
appreciate a bold and powerful treatment of fundamental themes. The 
general thought which pervades this book is beyond doubt the most impor- 
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Those who have read the work on Education, will remember the ana- 
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an eminent degree, the present volume. — N. Y. Tribune. 

We regard the distinguishing feature of this work to be the peculiarly 
interesting character of its matter to the general reader. This is a great 
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and entertaining. — Rochester Democrat. 



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V. Representative Government. 

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VII. Railway Morals and Railway Policy. 

VIII. Gracefulness. 

IX. State Tamperings with Money and Banks. 

X. Reform ; the Dangers and the Safeguards. 

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OR, 

THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO HUMAN HAPPINESS 

SPECIFIED, AND THE FIRST OF THEM 

DEVELOPED. 

In one Volume. Large 12mo. 

All these works are rich in materials for forming intelligent opinions, even where 
we are unable to agree with those put forth by the author. Much may be learned from 
them in departments in which our common Educational system is very deficient. Tho 
active citizen may derive from them accurate systematized information concerning his 
highest duties to society, and the principles on which they are based. He may gain 
clearer notions of the value and bearing of evidence, and be better able to distinguish 
between facts and inferences. He may find common things suggestive of wiser thought 
—nay, we will venture to say of truer emotion — than before. By giving us fuller reali- 
zations of liberty and justice his writings will tend to increase our self-reliance in tho 
great emergency of civilization to which we have been summoned.— Atlantic Monthly. 



Works of Herbert Spencer published by D. Appleton & Co. 
A NEW SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY. 

This work is now in course of publication in quarterly numbers (from 80 
to 100 pages each), by subscription, at $2 per annum. It is to form two vol- 
umes, of which the first is nearly completed, four numbers having been 
issued. While it comprises a statement of those general principles and laws 
of life to which science has attained, it is stamped with a marked originality? 
both in the views propounded and in the method of treating the subject. It 
will be a standard and invaluable work. Some idea of the discussion may 
be formed by glancing over a few of the first chapter headings. 

Part First. — Data op Biology. 

I. Organic Matter; II. The actions of Forces on Organic Matter; III. 
The Reactions of Organic Matter on Forces ; IV. Proximate Definition of 
Life ; V. The Correspondence between Life and its Circumstances ; VI. The 
Degree of Life Varies with the Degree of Correspondence ; VII Scope of 
Biology. 

Part Second. — Inductions op Biology. 

I. Growth ; II. Development ; III. Function ; IV. Waste and Repair ; 
V. Adaptation; VI. Individuality; VII. Genesis; VIII. Heredity; IX. 
Variation; X. Genesis, Heredity, and Variation; XI. Classification; XII. 
Distribution. 

Mr. Spencer is equally remarkable for his search after first principles ; 
for his acute attempts to decompose mental phenomena into their primary 
elements ; and for his broad generalizations of mental activity, mind in con- 
nection with instinct, and all the analogies presented by life in its universal 
aspects. — Medico- Chirurgical Review. 



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The most recondite topics are placed in a transparent light before the common mind, 
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The chapters on the Mutual Eelations of the Forces, and on the Dynamics of Vege- 
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The present volume exhibits plentiful traits of what we believe we have before 
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Unrivalled as a practical treatise. Its introduction on the " Origin and Nature cf 
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